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THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE: A
MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
John Yoo* & Glenn Sulmasy**

I.

INTRODUCTION

International law enforcement can work without any involvement
from the U.N. Security Council ("UNSC"). Cooperation between nations
does not require a formal organizational structure or extensive
international bureaucracy, and bypassing this establishment would
reduce the delay or inaction caused by the veto of the UNSC's
permanent members. One way to improve international law would be to
look at the relative success of the Proliferation Security Initiative
("PSI"). This Idea will proceed in three parts. Part II will discuss the
dangers of the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
("WMD"), particularly with regard to rogue states and international
terrorists. Part III will discuss why it has been difficult for the U.N.centered system to effectively respond to these concerns; and will
describe the PSI's effort to overcome them. Part IV will address
criticism of the PSI.
John Yoo is Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall) and a Visiting Scholar at The American Enterprise Institute. He is the author of War by Other
Means: An Insider'sAccount of the War on Terror (2006).
** Commander Glenn Sulmasy is an Associate Professor of Law at the United States Coast
Guard Academy. He is co-editor of International Law Challenges: Homeland Security and
Combating Terrorism (Thomas McK. Sparks & Glenn M. Sulmasy eds., 2006). The views he
expresses herein are his own and not necessarily those of the Department of Homeland Security, the
U.S. Coast Guard or the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.
*

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1
HOFS TRA LAW REVIEW

406

II.

THE DANGER OF

[Vol. 35:405

WMD PROLIFERATION

The proliferation of WMD has become a great concern for both the
United States and the international community. Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the potential for the spread of WMD has increased.
Several nations have since acquired nuclear weapons or begun
clandestine development programs. The possible harm from WMD
proliferation was amplified by the attacks carried out by al Qaeda on
September 11, 2001, which raised the specter of rogue nations
transferring WMD technology to international terrorists. The Taliban
permitted al Qaeda to train, staff, equip and carry out its international
terrorist operations from bases within Afghanistan.' Al Qaeda showed its
ability to reach across borders to carry out attacks with even more
devastating effect. Preventing the proliferation of WMD has become one
of the U.S. government's highest national security priorities.2
A primary focus of the Bush Administration's national security
strategy has been to prevent rogue nations from transferring WMD to
international terrorists. The 2003 National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism ("NSCT") notes: "Some irresponsible governments-or
extremist factions within them-seeking to further their own agenda
may provide terrorists access to WMD. ' 3 The 2002 National Security
Strategy similarly represents a shift in thinking from traditional nationstate threats to combating newly emerging threats to the United States:
"America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by
failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by
4
catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few."
The United States's answer to the problem is to disrupt these
networks of non-state actors and rogue nations who support them at the
earliest possibility rather than employing a "wait and see" approach.
This overall strategy is developed in two White House documents, the
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,5 issued in
December 2002, and the NSCT, issued in February 2003. These
1. John Yoo, InternationalLaw and the War in Iraq,97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 565 (2003).
2. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 1
(2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf
[hereinafter WHITE HOUSE, COMBAT WEAPONS]; see also Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Security

Strategies:A Legal Assessment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 737, 743 (2004).
3.

WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 21 (2003), available

at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter-terrorism/counterterrorism-strategy
.pdf.
4. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1 (2002), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf.
5.

WHITE HOUSE, COMBAT WEAPONS, supra note 2.
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documents develop a pre-emptive approach to disrupt imminent attacks
and to interdict WMD before they get into the hands of international
terrorists. President Bush made it clear in his State of the Union Address,
in January 2002, that an axis of evil had emerged that threatened peace
6
and security, specifically referring to Iran, Iraq and North Korea. These
three nations were perceived as the "rogue nation-states" who had the
desire, capability and irresponsibility to transport WMD technology to
the international terrorists.
Prior to 9/11, various nations had ratified agreements designed to
address the growing threat of WMD proliferation. Most had adopted the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention
and the Biological Weapons Convention. However, the new threats
required new action from the Security Council. In 2004, the United
States sponsored Security Council Resolution 1540 to update these
conventions. On April 28, 2004, the U.N. Security Council unanimously
called for the punishment of those who traffic in nuclear, chemical and
biological weapon components.7 It required "all 191 members of the
U.N. to punish any 'non-[S]tate actors' dealing in weapons of mass
destruction and technology.",8 It further required nations to "adopt and
enforce laws to prevent terrorists and black marketeers from being able
nuclear,
to 'manufacture acquire, possess, develop, transport or use
9
delivery.'
of
means
their
and
weapons
chemical or biological
III.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

The idea for a new, more flexible international "entity" emerged
after fifteen SCUD missiles were found onboard a North Korean
freighter. The North Korean vessel, So San, was stopped and boarded in
international waters by the Spanish Navy. At the time of the boarding,
the So San was approximately 600 miles from the coast of Yemen-its
intended destination. The missiles were discovered mixed in with the
main cargo that the vessel claimed to be transporting--cement. After
Yemen claimed that its right to receive cargo and equipment was

6. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
2002
2
0129-11 .html.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 /O1/print/
7. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
Apr.
8. USInfo.State.gov., U.N. Security Council Unanimously Passes Resolution4on WMD,
=
ri
28, 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=200 &m=Ap l&x
Res.
S.C.
(quoting
Council]
Security
U.N.
20040428174321FRllehctiMO.2683374 [hereinafter
1540, supra note 7).
9. Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 1540, supranote 7).
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permissible under international 10law, the So San was released and
permitted to continue its journey.
Existing international law did not permit confiscation of the
missiles and their components. Secretary of State Powell stated:
[A]fter getting assurances directly from the President of
Yemen... this was the last of a group of shipments that go back some
years and had been contracted for some years ago.., and we had
assurances that these missiles were for Yemeni defensive purposes
and.., in acknowledgement of the fact that it was on international
water and it was a sale that was out in the open and consistent with
international law.., we directed the ship to continue to its
destination. 1
The maritime boarding of the vessel was probably legal, but the seizure
of the weapons was not. Specifically, Yemen had acceded to the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (generally known as the "SUA Convention"), but
North Korea was neither a signatory nor a contracting party."
Regardless, the scope of that Convention still does not apply to the
content or destination of cargoes. Yemen is a party to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), but Article 110 of the
treaty provides that boarding a vessel on the high seas is permitted only
where 1) there is "reasonable ground for suspecting that" a vessel is
engaging in piracy, the slave trade or unauthorized broadcasting; 2) a
vessel is de facto stateless because it either lacks a flag or is flying
multiple "flags"; or 3) by the consent of the flag state of the vessel to
board. 13

Without the
material onboard
The International
true that-apart

consent of Yemen or North Korea, any seizure of the
14
was not authorized under existing international law.
Court of Justice ("ICJ") stated in 1927: "It is certainly
from certain special cases which are defined by

10. See Glenn Kessler & Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Frees Ship with North Korean Missiles;
Stand Is Reversed After Yemen Protests Seizure of 15 Scuds, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2002, at A l.
11. Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State, Remarks at the American Academy of Diplomacy Annual
Awards Presentation Luncheon (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/15887.htm.
12. See INT'L MAR. ORG., STATUS OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS IN
RESPECT OF WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION OR ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL
PERFORMS DEPOSITARY OR OTHER FUNCTIONS 354-58 (2005).

13. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 110, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/unclos.pdf.
14. See Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The ProliferationSecurity Initiative, 98 AM.
J.INT'L L. 526, 526-27 (2004).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/1

4

Yoo and Sulmasy: The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Model for International
2006]

PROLIFERA TION SECURITY INITIATIVE

international law-vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority
except that of the State whose flag they fly.,, 5 Other institutions claimed
there was no "legal authority" upon which to prevent such transportation
of WMD. A gap in international maritime law existed that would
threaten global peace and security by allowing the proliferation of
WMD. The well established U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation
on the high seas was at odds with its goal of preventing the proliferation,
sale and transport of WMD.
In Krakow, Poland in May 2003, President Bush announced his
intention to create an entity to help prevent the transport of WMD by
rogue nation-states on the seas into the hands of terrorists. 16 The creation
of a novel "concept"--not a new law or international regulatory body,
but an idea-to increase cooperation among nation-states and to
"remind" nations to use and implement existing legal authorities would
best prevent the transportation of WMD. The motivation of the PSI is to
terrorists with the
prevent rogue nations from supporting and supplying
17
technology or supplies needed to create WMD.
Frustrated with the U.N. Security Council's inability to act, the
United States created an "entity" that would have no headquarters, no
staff and no bureaucracy. 18 The United States viewed the Security
Council as too unwieldy and likely to be crippled by the veto power if it
sought a resolution for such activity.' 9 Past experience has demonstrated
the inability of the UNSC to effectively meet the challenges of
traditional or new threats to international security. One of us has written
elsewhere that the U.N. Security Council has not helped to reduce war or
conflict.2 ° In addition, the United Nations was created in the age of the
nation-state and is not adequately suited to help prevent the threats
associated with international terrorism. Rogue states now often "share

15. Id. at 527 (quoting Case of S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 25
(Sept. 7)).
16. President George W. Bush, Remarks to the People of Poland (May 31, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html.
17. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet, Proliferation
Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles (Sept. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Interdiction
Principles], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030904-l I.html.
18. Supporters of the PSI often use this lack of structure as being one of its greatest assets.
For example, see Admiral Mike Mullen, Remarks at the RUSI Future Maritime Warfare Conference
(Dec.
13, 2005), available at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen
051213.txt.
19. China was likely to have vetoed any resolution calling for interdiction of illegal
proliferation components, technology or parts on the seas.
20.

See John C. Yoo, Force Rules: U.N. Reform and Intervention, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 641, 644-

45 (2006).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:405

the undeterrable character of terrorist organizations, because they have
removed themselves from the international system., 21 This heightened
the need to develop new methods to combat threats to international
security outside of the UNSC framework.
IV.

INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE

It was against this backdrop that the PSI was created. It coordinates
action against proliferation without interfering with existing customary
international maritime law (including freedom of navigation) or Article
110 the Law of the Sea Convention. It builds upon the political
commitment of nations in bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements
permitting boardings of their vessels (whether in the territorial waters or
upon the high seas), while still relying upon existing authorities in
UNCLOS. It relies on greater sharing of intelligence among participants
to make tracking and boarding of vessels with WMD material more
effective.2 2
The major obligation of the PSI participants is to abide by the
Statement of Interdiction Principles-the primary purpose of which is to
exercise existing domestic authority in order to interdict weapons and
materials that could be used for the production or use of WMD. 23 The
Principles specifically require all member states concerned with this
threat to international peace and security to commit to the following
principles:
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other
states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their
delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant
information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting
the confidential character of classified information provided by
other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources
and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize
coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
21. Seeid. at 647.
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg, The
Proliferation Security Initiative: Security vs. Freedom of Navigation?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHALLENGES, HOMELAND SECURITY AND COMBATING TERRORISM 55, 55-71 (Thomas McK.

Sparks & Glenn M. Sulmasy eds., 2006) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW CHALLENGES].
23. See Interdiction Principles, supra note 17.
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3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal
authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and
work to strengthen when necessary relevant international laws and
frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding
cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the
extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with
their obligations under international law and frameworks, to
include:
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to
or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and
not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown
by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel
flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or
areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is
reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from
states or non-state actors of proliferation concerns, and to seize
such cargoes that are identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag
vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related
cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their
internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when
declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying
such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are
identified; and (2) enforce conditions on vessels entering or
leaving their ports, internal waters, or territorial seas that are
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as
requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and
seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause
shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states
or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are
transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any
such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights
through their airspace in advance of such flights.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006
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f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as
transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect
vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably
suspected of carrying
24 such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes
that are identified.
PSI promotes cooperation and intelligence sharing between
participating members.25 It is consistent with the U.N. Security Council
Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the
proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and
security. 2266 The PSI is also consistent with statements of the G8 and the
European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts
are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems
and related materials.2 7 Through the implementation of the Interdiction
Principles, participants engage in cooperative efforts to stop the flow of
these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern.
PSI formalizes cooperation by nation-states whose vessels, flags,
ports, territorial waters, airspace or land might be used for illegal WMD
proliferation. 28 As of this writing, over sixty nation-states have signed on
to PSI. 29 There are fifteen nations that form the core of the PSIincluding the United States, Russia, Japan, France, Germany and the
United Kingdom. Equally important, the PSI has spurred numerous bilateral agreements between nation-states to support this effort. For
example, six nations (a majority of vessels fly these nations' flags) have
signed bi-lateral Mutual Ship Boarding Pacts with the United States,
permitting boarding operations to occur (even upon the high seas) for
24. Id.
25. For a discussion of the need for increased intelligence collection and sharing, see SIMON
CHESTERMAN, LowY INST. FOR INT'L POLICY, SHARED SECRETS: INTELLIGENCE AND COLLECTIVE
SECURITY (2006).

26. See Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23500,
at 4-5 (Jan. 31, 1992), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9BNote by the
[hereinafter
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20S23500.pdf
President].
27. See G8, Gleneagles Statement on Non-Proliferation (2005), http://www.fco.gov.uk/
Files/kfile/PostG8_.GleneaglesCounterProliferation.pdf ("[T]he proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, together with international terrorism, remain the preeminent threats to international peace and security. The threat of the use of WMD by terrorists calls
for redoubled efforts."); Note by the President, supra note 26, at 4-5.
28. See BUREAUS OF NONPROLIFERATION & PuB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUBL'N
NO.

11254,

UNITED

STATES

INITIATIVES

TO

PREVENT

PROLIFERATION

2

(2005),

www.state.gov/documents/organization/47000.pdf.
29. Id.
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ships sailing under the flags of the nations included (the United States,
Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Panama).3 °
These agreements are critical to overcoming many of the obstacles
observed in the So San incident. Flag state consent will ensure the
legality of boarding on the high seas, and arguably, permit many of the
seizures as well.
The most unique component of the PSI is that it has no
bureaucracy, no permanent staff and no treaty obligations. The PSI
represents an initiative by the United States to utilize existing tools
under customary international law and the Law of the Sea Convention.
Under UNCLOS, participating members are permitted to board vessels
of other nationalities operating within their territorial waters (12NM)
and even the Contiguous Zone (24NM-used for Fiscal, Immigration,
Customs and Sanitations purposes) or when given consent. 3 PSI
coordinates exercise of these two authorities to allow the United States
and cooperating nations to search vessels suspected of carrying WMDrelated materials.
The PSI advances the concepts of collective action and intelligence
sharing. It creates a system for states to work together in naval exercises,
interdiction planning and coordination, and lays the groundwork for
ensuring that flag states consent to such boarding and seizures (even if
upon the high seas through bi-lateral and multilateral agreements). PSI
has produced eleven successful interdictions since its inception.3 2 One in
particular was the interception (conducted in coordination with the
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy) of the vessel
BBC China that was loaded with nuclear-related materials enroute to
Libya. Undersecretary of State John Bolton asserted that this interdiction
"helped convince Libya that the days of undisturbed accumulation of
WMD were over," and that this had helped unravel Dr. A.Q. Khan's
proliferation network.3 3 These successes demonstrate that the PSI can
advance international peace and security, but without the costs of

30. See U.S. Dep't of State, Ship Boarding Agreements, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c
12386.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2007) (including links to each of the agreements with these
countries).
31. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 27, 73, 110, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397, available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/unclos.pdf.
32.

SHARON SQUASSONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PROLIFERATION

SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 3 (2005) (citing Sec'y Condoleeza Rice, Remarks on the Second
Anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative (May 31, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/4695 l.htm).
33. See John Bolton, An All-Out War on Proliferation,FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 7, 2004, at
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permanent bureaucracy and the delay of formalized decision-making
processes.
V.

CRITICISMS OF THE PSI

Critics of the PSI assert that the effort is an attack on the freedom of
navigation on the seas; is ambiguous and has no structure; is nothing
more than a "power grab" by the United States; or that it violates
existing international law regarding self-defense.34 We suggest that these
concerns are mistaken.
Concerns often deal with violations of freedom of navigation.35
Specifically, critics refer to Article 19 of UNCLOS guaranteeing
innocent passage for ships through the territorial waters of coastal
countries. They assert that the boardings conducted as part of the PSI
contradict UNCLOS (which the United States has not ratified but
considers customary international law nonetheless, with the exception of
the deep sea bed mining provisions). Critics also refer to Article 88 of
UNCLOS, which declares that "[t]he high seas shall be reserved for
peaceful purposes.

36

The critics assert that the aggressive nature, not

necessarily of the boarding itself, but of the seizure of goods, will act as
a catalyst for conflict. Kim Jong I1has asserted that if a North Korean
vessel is boarded, he will construe the boarding as an act of war.37
The criticisms are misplaced. The Interdiction Principles do not
impact the existing international law of the sea, but rather embrace it and
act as a commitment of nations to work together to utilize their
enforcement powers already embodied within UNCLOS. The PSI does
not in any way impact freedom of navigation. Itcarefully balances the
legitimate needs of freedom of navigation and the need to prevent the
transport of WMD. It does not alter or change the existing requirements
in UNCLOS under Article 110. Under the PSI, if boardings or
subsequent seizures of WMD do occur on the high seas, they would still
have to conform to international law. Through the increased
collaboration of participants, however, flag states of these vessels are
34. See generally,

e.g.,

Daniel

H.

Joyner,

The

Proliferation

Security

Initiative:

Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and International Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 507 (2005)

(critiquing the methods employed by the PSI and contemplating its limits under international law);
Dan Smith, A Challenge Too Narrow: The Proliferation Security Initiative, FOREIGN POL'Y IN
FocuS, Oct. 16, 2003, http://www.fpif.org/pdf/reports/PRprolif2003.pdf (same).
35. See, e.g., Michael Evans, U.S. Plans to Seize Suspects at Will, TIMES (London), July 11,
2003, at 23.
36. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 88, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/unclos.pdf.
37. See Smith, supra note 34.
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now likely to consent to such actions at the time of the boardings or
through the creation of multi-lateral agreements. In addition, the
Interdiction Principles predominately emphasize that the participants use
existing international legal authority to support such boardings.
Specifically, the Principles refer to intelligence sharing (Principle 2),
strengthening domestic legal authorities for boardings/seizures within
participants' waters (Principle 3) and to take actions to support
interdiction within their domestic authority (Principle 4).38 None of these
principles contradicts existing international law.
Professor Mark Shulman asserts many critics are, in reality,
concerned about the lack of formality and structure of the PSI. 39 For
many international scholars and practitioners, this ambiguity and lack of
structure is a means for the United States to impose a unilateral approach
to security. In addition, they are concerned there can be no real impact
due to the "soft" nature of the PSI. Such critics mistakenly believe that
the promotion of international security requires a bureaucracy in order to
be effective. As Colin Powell noted in Foreign Affairs, initiatives such
as the PSI are actually a part of the "Strategy of Partnerships" that the
United States has embraced in order to win the war on terror.40 The
proliferation of WMD is a global problem-not one that the United
States can unilaterally solve. The PSI is a voluntary, multi-national
commitment by sixty or so participants working toward the elimination
of the illegal transport of WMD.
Other critics view the PSI as being an overly broad interpretation of
the right to self-defense articulated in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Some see it as an expansion of the concept of self-defense to formally
include anticipatory self-defense or pre-emption as accepted doctrine.
Applying the celebrated Caroline incident on anticipatory self-defense,
necessity and proportionality would still need to be a component of the
decision-making process, and, they argue, the PSI violates the
immediacy of the threat to constitute the lawful right of self-defense.41
Daniel Joyner asserts that the right of self-defense, through the plain
reading of the text of Article 51, is not sufficient to act as a broad
principle justifying the PSI. Further, he asserts there is nothing within
existing customary international law to provide the requisite legal
38. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
39. Mark R. Shulman, The ProliferationSecurity Initiative and the Evolution of the Law on
the Use of Force, 28 HOus. J. INT'L L 771, 776-77 (2006).
40. Colin L. Powell, Essay, A Strategy of Partnerships,FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 22,
24, 34.
41. Joyner, supranote 34, at 521-25.
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authority for these measures.42 The PSI, however, never specifically
asserts that the procedures are conducted in self-defense. But if it did,
the PSI could be justified upon a self-defense argument-not through a
strict reading of Article 51 but rather by the evolving customary
application of self-defense in the world today.43 Measures to prevent
global insecurity are more important today than ever before, whether or
not such operations conducted in peacetime are labeled as "self-defense"
or not.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The PSI should serve as a model for future cooperation in
international affairs. It offers a way to avoid many of the weaknesses
inherent in the structure of the Security Council. It promotes global
security, cooperation and enhanced intelligence sharing by nation-states.
It also strikes an appropriate balance between nation-state sovereignty
and international law by preventing the spread of WMD by those who
operate outside the community of nations. As threats from nations such
as North Korea and Iran continue to undermine peace and security in the
twenty-first century, the PSI's lack of structure is its greatest asset. As
the United Nations struggles to enhance its effectiveness, the PSI offers
an example of international cooperation by nation-states without the
politicization and bureaucracy so prevalent in the global body today.

42. See id.
43.

See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004). For a detailed discussion of

the use of force within the PSI framework, see also Craig Allen, Limits on the Use of Force in
Maritime Operations in Support of WMD Counter-ProliferationInitiatives, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW CHALLENGES, supra note 22.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/1

12

